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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

19 May 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

While Khrushchev probably did not intend to torpedo the summit conference when on 5 May he began to exploit the aircraft incident, he completely miscalculated the nature of Washington's reaction and then interpreted American official statements as defiance of the USSR and as an affront to his own prestige and that of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev apparently had decided before he left for Paris on 14 May to break up the summit meeting by confronting President Eisenhower with patently unacceptable demands regarding the U-2 incident, cast in the most insulting terms.

Several Soviet and satellite sources claim privately that Khrushchev's behavior in Paris stemmed from a feeling of "humiliation" in the face of the American "defiance," which had the effect of placing the USSR in the position of a "second-class power." Following the meeting of the heads of government on 16 May, the Soviet premier reportedly complained bitterly to bloc diplomats about President Eisenhower.

b3 Khrushchev also stated he had been prepared to close out the incident immediately if the President had said he was unaware of the flights or had disapproved. Bloc diplomats in Moscow emphasized to American officials that Khrushchev had

been placed in a "bad position" of inequality because of the American statements, which they viewed as indicating that overflights would continue.

The abruptness and closely held nature of Moscow's shift was reflected by considerable evidence that the Soviet propaganda apparatus was forced into a complete reversal following Khrushchev's opening statement in Paris on 16 May. Three hours after Khrushchev's statement, TASS sent out instructions to the Soviet regional press canceling earlier stories on the summit.

Post-Summit Policy

Khrushchev's 18 May press conference suggests that he will vigorously press his bitter anti-American campaign in an attempt to brand the US as responsible for preventing a summit meeting and a relaxation of tensions. In an effort to secure the initiative following the collapse of the summit, Gromyko requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to "examine the question of aggressive acts by the air force of the US, creating a threat to peace."

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Khrushchev indicated earlier that Moscow would counter any setback in the Security Council with action in the General Assembly. Moscow will also attempt to keep the issue alive with a trial of the American pilot.

Khrushchev's extemporaneous remarks on other East-West issues at his press conference, together with the line taken privately by Soviet spokesmen, are designed to give the impression that Moscow does not intend to make any sharp reversals in the other major lines of its foreign policy. Both Khrushchev's remarks and Gromyko's [REDACTED]

b3 [REDACTED] dealt with the disarmament and nuclear test ban conferences in a manner which implied that they expected the negotiations to continue.

In an apparent reference to the American announcement of 7 May, Khrushchev warned, however, that if the US conducted tests for research purposes, the USSR would follow by testing "nuclear weapons." He also said that the USSR was "almost convinced" that the West did not want disarmament and that if Moscow met with further "procrastination," it would take the disarmament question to the UN.

b3 [REDACTED] Gromyko stated that the USSR intended to take no action to increase tension or make trouble during the six-to-eight month interval proposed by Khrushchev before another

summit meeting. He avoided a direct answer as to whether Khrushchev would sign a separate peace treaty during his visit to Berlin, and repeated the standard Soviet position that if no agreement were reached with the West, Moscow would be forced to sign a separate treaty.

Khrushchev took a similar position in his press conference, but he warned that the USSR had almost reached the "limits" of its effort to conclude a treaty with both Germanys and that when this point was reached, the treaty would be signed and announced to the world.

The charge that the United States wrecked the Paris talks with its "provocative" actions against the Soviet Union remains the central theme of Moscow's propaganda. President Eisenhower's statement of 16 May that overflights have been suspended was not reported at first, but bloc commentators have followed Khrushchev's lead in dismissing the statement as a mere "maneuver to avoid responsibility." Soviet media report mass meetings in the Soviet Union denouncing American "treachery and provocation," and both President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter are personally attacked in bitter terms. Following selective jamming of broadcasts on the plane incident, Moscow on 17 May apparently resumed massive jamming of VOA Russian-language broadcasts.

Despite the harsh attacks against the US, Moscow broadcasts have conveyed no immediate

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
sense of crisis and have given no undue stress to claims of Soviet military strength. In an unusual move shortly after Khrushchev's 18 May press conference, TASS began transmitting an account of a New York Times article in which "diplomats in Moscow" are cited as claiming that Khrushchev plans no change in his policies of basing military strength on rockets, raising the standard of living, and widening contacts with the outside world.

Chinese Communist Reaction

As the summit approached, Chinese leaders seemed resigned to the fact that the meetings would be held but maintained their line that "no unrealistic illusions" should be entertained toward the United States, the "number-one enemy of world peace." On 14 May, Mao Tse-tung stated that despite "big or small achievements," the winning of world peace must depend "mainly" on resolute struggle. He went

on to say that he hoped that these people--i.e., Khrushchev--who have described Eisenhower as a man who "cherishes peace" would be awakened by recent "aggressive" American actions. Mao's remarks suggested some apprehension that an accord might be reached which would undercut his policy of unremitting hostility toward the US and a desire to go on record as saying that summit results would not change China's foreign policy.

Peiping's initial comment on the summit breakdown implies that the conference has justified Peiping's distrust of Khrushchev's policy of detente. It is probable, however, that any Chinese action in the wake of the summit will be in line with the over-all Sino-Soviet bloc policies Khrushchev will develop out of the wreckage of the summit.



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